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Karesh: Wills and Trusts
WILLS AND TRUSTS
COLEMAN KARESH*

Contractto Make Will
The Supreme Court, in the period under review, had before
it two cases involving contracts to make a will. In Looper v.
Whitaker,' the area of law involving mutual and reciprocal
wills was enlarged. The action, which was for specific performance, was brought by a surviving husband against the
administrator c.t.a. and the deviseeg of his deceased wife. The
complaint alleged that the husband and wife had made reciprocal wills pursuant to contract, and that the wife had
breached the contract by revoking her will and making another
will in different terms. The lower court, without prior reference to a master or submission of issues to a jury, found
that there had been a contract and held for the plaintiff, but
the Supreme Court reversed, declaring that the facts did not
support the existence of a contract. The Court reiterated
the requirement that the evidence to establish an alleged contract to make a will must be clear and convincing, and that
the proof here fell short of that standard. Moreover, the
Court lays down the rule that reciprocal provisions in separate wills - even of husband and wife - are not "'in the
absence of a recital that they are made pursuant to a contract, in themselves sufficient evidence of an enforceable
contract between the testators for the execution of the wills.' "
"It may be said.., that it is within common knowledge that
many married couples make reciprocal wills, but it does not
follow from that alone, or from the agreement to do so, that
each spouse is thereby bound against revocation or subsequent alteration of his or her will, without notice to the
other." (Italics added.)
The words just emphasized seem to indicate that it is the
Court's view that even if there had been a contract, either
testator could revoke on notice; and there is a similar intimation in other language in the opinion: "It is not clear and
convincing that there was a contract by which the testatrix
was bound not to alter or revoke her first will, at least without
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 231 S. C. 219, 98 S. E. 2d 266 (1957).
155
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notice to respondent." The right to revoke upon notice certainly has ample authority ;2 and there is some authority that
where the first to die has revoked his will even without notice
the survivor has no enforceable rights, on the theory that the
survivor has the opportunity to revoke his own will and is
not prejudiced by the other's act.3 It seems to be assumed,
however, in the present case that where there are mutual
wills, or a joint will, made pursuant to contract, the survivor may enforce the contract despite revocation by the
other if there has been no notice of revocation during the
joint lives of the parties. The South Carolina case of Turnipseed v. Sirrine4 would seem to support the assumption.
The second contract-to-will case was one in which there was
clearly a contract to devise, but specific performance of the
contract was refused. In Large v. Large5 the plaintiff sought
specific performance of a contract embodied in a "deed" executed by his natural parents to the named defendant and her
husband (whose administratrix the former was), under which
the natural parents surrendered the custody of the plaintiff,
then two years old. The "deed" provided that the foster parents agreed that the child should "by proper devise and bequest be made equal with their own children in the distribution
of their estates." The foster father died intestate, without
children, and survived by his wife, three sisters and a brother;
and this action followed to impress a trust upon his property
and for specific performance in the form of a decree declaring
the plaintiff entitled to one-half of the property. The defendants, the heirs, contended that the plaintiff was not entitled because his conduct had been "unworthy, undutiful and
unfilial." The master's finding that the plaintiff should be
denied relief because of such conduct was affirmed by the
circuit judge in a decree setting out various instances of disobedience, misconduct, violation of law, friction, etc. These
acts began when the plaintiff was fourteen years of age. The
holding was based principally upon the ground that since spe2. See 169 A. L. R. 9, 50 et seq. (1947). There is dictum to this effect
in Wilson v. Gordon, 73 S. C. 155, 159, 53 S. E. 79 (1905).
3. See 169 A. L. R. 9,52 (1947). The English case of Stone v. Hos-

kins, Prob. Div., 1905 [1905] p. 194 best represents this view.
4. 57 S.C. 559, 35 S.E. 757, 76 Am. St. Rep. 580 (1900). A, niece,

and B, aunt, made mutual reciprocal wills pursuant to contract. It was
alleged and apparently proved that they had expressly agreed that the
wills were to be irrevocable. A revoked her will, leaving another. B was
held entitled to specific performance.
5. 232 S.C. 70, 100 S.E. 2d 825 (1957).
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cific performance is addressed to the conscience and discretion
of the court, the court, in that exercise, did not see fit in the
light of the plaintiff's behavior to reward him with enforcement of the contract. In addition the circuit judge declared
that "[a] lthough not expressly stated, there is implied a consideration in the deed of the society, companionship and filial
obedience of the Plaintiff."
The Supreme Court affirmed the concurrent findings of
fact of the master and the circuit judge as to the nature of the
plaintiff's conduct. Because of the insufficiency, or perhaps
lack, of exception challenging the holding of the implication
of required filial obedience in the contract, the Supreme Court
stated that "whether or not the premise thus stated is a
sound principle of law, applicable generally to contracts of this
nature, is a matter we need not decide. Its correctness is not
challenged by the exception here, and it is therefore the law
of the case.'"6
6. It is not clear whether the implied condition or consideration mentioned by the circuit judge, or the Supreme Court's reference to the
decree's holding that "in the deed

...

there was implied an agreement

that appellant would when old enough to do so, render filial obedience
to his foster parents and give to them his companionship and filial devotion," denotes an interpretation of the contract showing such an intention, or whether it means a constructive condition implied in law. There
are no cases in South Carolina dealing with the problem of whether as
a matter of interpretation or constructive condition an agreement to
devise property to a child in consideration of the surrender of custody
carries with it the implication of filial obedience. For that matter there
is no sizeable amount of authority on the point, and the authorities cited
by successful counsel in annotations on the subject deal in the main with
filial service, affection and society as such part performance as to render
an oral contract enforceable, or point to them as acts not computable in
money value and amenable to specific performance on that account.
What is or ought to be the law in this State, aside from general considerations of Equity's withholding its award from an unworthy suitor in its
discretion, is a matter of argument.
The case is interesting from several aspects. Even if the plaintiff had
not been guilty of unfilial behavior, a literal application of the contract
would leave him helpless, since the foster parents agreed that the plaintiff "should be made equal with their own children in the distribution
of their estate." The foster parents had no children, and there was therefore no basis for equal distribution. Of course, if the plaintiff had been
adopted-as distinguished from his custody having been transferred, see
Hatchell v. Norton, 170 S.C. 272, 170 S. E. 341 (1933) - he would have
taken as an heir despite his unworthiness. If he had been adopted and
there had been no contract to devise, he could have been effectively disinherited without regard to his conduct. 97 A. L. I. 1018 (1935). Paradoxically, if he had been adopted and there had been a contract to devise,
and if the adoptive parent had not willed his adoptive son anything but
had died intestate, the child apparently would take as an heir in the face
of his misconduct. There are considerations, too, of a non-legal character.
Why should there be an implied consideration or condition of filial
obedience? The child whose custody has been relinquished by his natural
parents, although the beneficiary of the contract, has made no such
promise, nor have his parents made it for him-except as one reads it
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Contest - Undue Influence
The rule that a contest in the circuit court as to the validity
of a will presents legal - as distinguished from equitable issues was followed in Harrisv. Berry.7 In that case the testator's wife, who had been principal beneficiary under her
husband's earlier will, instituted an attack upon the later
will. The parties by-passed trial in the probate court and proceeded directly in the circuit court, a procedure sanctioned
under the authority of Muldrow v. Jeffords.8 The issue of
mental capacity was decided in favor of the proponent of the
will, but the jury found that the will was the result of undue
influence on the part of one of the beneficiaries. The Supreme
Court declared that "whether a case of 'will or no will' in the
circuit court arises by appeal or by consent after waiver of
the probate court hearing, the issues submitted to the jury
as to mental capacity and undue influence are, under the settled law of this state, treated as factual issues in a law case;
and the jury's finding will not be disturbed on appeal if there
is any evidence to sustain it." The Court restates the usual
definitions of undue influence - in substance that undue influence invalidating a will "must be such as to overcome the
testator's wishes and to substitute for them those of the other
person"; "and that the mere influence of affection and attachment, or the mere desire of gratifying the wishes of another, will not vitiate a testamentary act unless that act was
the result of coercion or importunity beyond the testator's
power to resist." It concluded that while "the question posed
above is a very close one under all of the evidence here" the
evidence was sufficient to carry the case to the jury."
into the contract. The foster parent, disappointed as he may be in the
child, has at least had for many years the companionship of the intant
and then of the boy: is the ultimate disappointment to outweigh those
years of parental pleasure to override the fact that the natural parents
gave up their child in return for a promise clearly expressed? A parent
may, in his freedom of testation, punish the unruly child by disinheriting him; but the same freedom of testation permits him to cut off the
worthy and perhaps needy child and to bestow his bounty upon the
unworthy and undeserving one. And if he dies intestate, the rain of
succession falls on the good and the bad alike (except for the faithless
wife and the homicidal heir).
7. 231 S. C. 201, 98 S. E. 2d 251 (1957).
8.144 S. C. 509, 142 S. E. 602 (1927).
9. But see the statement in Smith v. Whetstone, 203 S. C. 78, 83, 30
S. E. 2d 127 (1946) : "But the circumstances relied on to show it [undue
influence] must be such as, taken together, point unmistakably and
convincingly (italics supplied) to the fact that the mind of the testator
was subjected to that of some other person, so that the will is that of
the latter, and not of the former." The Supreme Court here reversed a
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Although the evidence was thus sufficient for the consideration of the jury, the Supreme Court reversed, because of error
on the part of the trial judge in refusing to admit in evidence
letters written by the testator to certain beneficiaries which
indicated a lack or diminution of affection for his wife and
which thus had a distinct bearing on the question of undue
influence. The trial judge was held to have taken an erroneous
view of the Dead Man's Statute, 10 upon which he based his
rejection of the proffered evidence.
Applicability of Non-Claim Statute
In Wallace v. Timmons" the Supreme Court had occasion
for the first time to consider in a substantial way the operation of the non-claim statute.1 2 The plaintiff, ancillary receiver of insolvent insurance company, sued the defendant,
individually and as executrix of her deceased husband, seeking
an accounting and the recovery of an alleged trust fund which
had come to her from her husband. The allegations were that
the husband was the agent of the insurance company and that
the terms of the agency agreement made him a trustee and
the moneys received by him trust funds; and that at the time
of his death there were certain special bank deposits in his
name in which funds collected for the company had been
commingled. The testator had died in 1948, in which year
administration was commenced; the plaintiff had filed a claim
in 1951, which had never been acted upon in any way. This
action was brought in 1956.
The circuit judge sustained a demurrer to the complaint
principally on the ground of failure to file a claim within the
period of the non-claim statutes (then eleven months following the first notice to creditors) ,'3 taking the general position
jury's finding of undue influence. For one of the best expressions as to
the reasons for non-reviewability of fact findings in a will contest,
see In re Solomon's Estate, '74 S. C. 189, 54 S. E. 207 (1906).
10. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 26-402. For a discussion

of this phase of the case see the subject of Evidence in this survey.
11. 232 S. C. 311, 101 S.E. 2d 844 (1958).
12. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 19-473, 19-474.
13. Since reduced to five months. Acts 1956, No. 767, § 7. The amendment thus reducing the time for presentation of claims does not simply
strike out eleven months and substitute five. The original statute
§ 19-474] reads: "All claims of creditors of such estate shall upon the
expiration of eleven months after the publication of the notice prescribed
in § 19-47a be forever barred unless before the expiration of such period
an account thereof duly attested, shall have been filed with such executor or administrator or with the judge of probate of the county in which
such estate is being administered.- * *." The 1956 amendment reads "All
claims of creditors of such estate shall not later than the expiration of
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that the statutes destroyed all legal and equitable claims, not
presented in time and on the further ground of laches. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that, taking the allegations
of the complaint to be true for purposes of the demurrer, the
action was one to recover a trust fund and that for that reason
the non-claim statutes had no application; that the statutes
have reference "to the claims of creditors, and relate to debts
of the testator payable from his estate"; that if there were in
fact such a trust fund it was not a part of decedent's estate,
to which the statutes were directed. 14 There was error, also,
the Court held, in the lower court's conclusion on demurrer
that there was laches. Aside from the general matter of the
method of, and the circumstances for, raising the question of
laches, the Court held that "[e] ven if it appears from the complaint that there has been a long delay in instituting the suit,
the court should not decide the question on a demurrer if
there are allegations in the pleading tending to show explanation or excuse for the delay", and that the issue of laches
could be disposed of only upon a hearing of the facts.
AdministratorDe Bonis Non
In In re Estate of Nettles' 5 the unusual feature of objection
to appointment of an administrator d.b.n. on the ground of
five months after the first publication of the notice prescribed in
§ 19-473, be filed, duly attested, with such executor or administrator or
with the judge of probate of the county in which such estate is being
administered. * * '. It is to be noticed that the amendment does not
expressly undertake to bar the claim as does the earlier legislation, but
it is doubtful, to say the least, that the legislature intended to convert
the statute from a non-claim statute into something else, particularly
when it is considered that the general purpose of the extensive amendatory legislation of 1956 was to shorten the period of the administration
of estates.
14. The opinion in this case followed a rehearing after a prior opinion
rendered in August, 1957 (Westbrook Advance Sheets, August 24, 1957,
No. 17339). The prior opinion likewise held that there was error in sustaining the demurrer but gave as one of the grounds that the statutes
applied "only to claims against the estate as distinguished from claims
against the assets in the hands of the distributee." In other respects the
prior opinion parallels the later one, which is reviewed. The later opinion
does not specifically declare that the earlier opinion is withdrawn, but
it is rather obviously intended to do so, a conclusion borne out by the
fact that the former opinion has not been published in the reports.
As to the necessity of presentation of claims for property held in
a fiduciary capacity, see 21 AM. JuR., Executors any Administrators
§§ 353, 354 (1939). See also § 921. A host of questions will arise anew
in this case, such as whether the filing of the claim with the executrix
in 1951 (although late) created an election; whether the inability to
identify the fund specifically restores the application of the non-claim
statutes; whether a constructive trust arose, and, if so, if and when
the statute of limitations began to operate.
15. 231 S. C. 214, 97 S. E. 2d 987 (1957).
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estoppel was presented. The original administratrix, wife of
the intestate, had been granted a discharge in due course.
Thereafter two surety companies, sureties on the bonds of the
deceased husband as principal, sought to reopen the estate
by the appointment of an administrator d.b.n., whom they
nominated, on the ground that after the granting of the discharge the defalcations of the principal, a teller in the obligee
bank, had been discovered; and that the sureties thereafter
had discharged their liability to the bank and had obtained
an assignment of the bank's claims to them. The former
administratrix resisted the application on the ground that
representatives of the sureties had acquiesced in or consented
to her discharge, and that the sureties were on that account
estopped to seek the new appointment.
The probate court denied the application for appointment
but it was reversed by the circuit court. The Supreme Court
upheld the lower court, holding, as did the court below, that
the facts did not justify either waiver or estoppel; that while
the representatives of the sureties did not object to the discharge, they were not in a position at the time to know of the
facts establishing liability of the principal to the bank; and
that under the circumstances it could not be said that there
had been the voluntary relinquishment of a known right which
is the essence of waiver, nor had there been present the elements required for an estoppel. The Court further observed,
in answer to an argument that the sureties as subrogees were
in no better position than the bank - which it was contended
was estopped because of its failure to object to the discharge
that the bank knew no more of the ultimate liability of
the principal than the sureties did.'(
16. There is no basic impediment to reopening an estate by the appointment of an administrator d.b.n. after the original administrator has been
discharged. McNair v. Howle, 123 S. C. 252, 116 S. E. 279 (1922), where
it is said that the effect of a discharge is to vacate the office of the
representative but is not an adjudication that the estate has been fully
administered. What course the administration of the reopened estate in
this case has taken this writer has not undertaken to ascertain, but
there are undoubtedly interesting questions that it has posed or will
pose. While the administrator d.b.n. in this case was the nominee of
claimants and in a certain sense subservient to them, the duty to the
distributees, including the wife, remains unimpaired including the duty
to defend. The matter of the presentation of claims within the period
of the non-claim statute must necessarily arise and introduces the same,
and even broader, problems as those appearing in Wallace v. Timmons,
reviewed above. The sureties' remedies here were two-fold: indemnity

and subrogation. The sureties would probably justify the non-presenta-

tion of their claims for indemnity within the non-claim period on the
ground that the claims were contingent-a point not yet passed on locally
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Receivership
The rare instance of an administration being instituted and
carried on by means of a receivership appears in Vasiliades V.
Vasiliades.17 Since the case is primarily concerned with receivership as such, the case will be limited here to the aspects of administration. The plaintiff, claiming to be the
wife of the intestate by virtue of a ceremony in Greece, alleged
that she and the defendants were the heirs and distributees
of the intestate, who had left a large real and personal estate;
that no administration had been had, and that the defendants,
one of whom was sued individually and as administrator [sic]
de son tort, had taken exclusive possession of the proparty,
without accounting to her; that the defendants were hostile
to her and had instituted suit in Greece to invalidate her marriage. The complaint asked that the Court of Common Pleas
assume jurisdiction of the estate, appoint a receiver with
power and direction to administer the estate; and for partition, and other relief that might be equitable. The circuit
judge appointed a receiver, with direction to administer.
Thereafter a lengthy series of legal maneuvers took place,
which culminated, in part, in dissolution of the receivership
by the lower court. The Supreme Court held this action to be
proper, holding in substance that since the appointment of a
receiver is largely discretionary with the court to which application is made, revocation of the appointment is likewise discretionary, and under the circumstances was justified in this
case. Is
in the interpretation of the statute. See 21 AM. JUR., Exceutors and Administrators § 365 (1939). See also for general discussion of the South
Carolina statute, 2 S. C. L. Q. 354-359 (1950). As subrogees of the bank,
which did not present a claim within the allowable period, their position
would probably be that the bank was under no duty to present its claim
because liability to it was based upon misappropriation and breach of
trust-a point also not passed on in this State and as to which there is
elsewhere a division of authority. See 21 Am. JUR., Executors and Administrators § 354 (1939).
If the administrator d.b.n. were to allow the sureties' claims and was
upheld in so doing, the problem then would become one of refunding by
the distributees. See MeNair v. Howle, ante; 41 MIcH. L. Rnv. 920
(1943).
17. 231 S. C. 366, 98 S. E. 2d 310 (1957).
18. Neither the lower court nor the Supreme Court in this case diccusses the propriety of the receivership as a means of original adminiztration, with all that such an administration entails-including advertising for creditors, furnishing an inventory, obtaining an appraisal and
so on. In view of the receiver's removal, any discussion would be academic. No doubt a receiver may be appointed to conserve the property
before administration, 21 AM. JuR., Executors and Administrators § 1005
(1939), but that function is quite different from an actual administra-
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A ground of exception made by the plaintiff was the lower
court's refusal of the receiver's motion for discovery and appraisal of assets. The Supreme Court upheld this course of
action, holding that the question raised was sufficiently disposed of by the fact of the receiver's dismissal. Further, the
Court held that the lower court had "by its early orders assumed jurisdiction to administer the personal estate of decedent but subsequent developments moved it to relinquish
that jurisdiction, and the action remains one to partition real
estate. 19 In the matter of the estates of decedents the Court
of Common Pleas and the Probate Court have concurrent
jurisdiction. ...
No sound reason is advanced against the
propriety of relinquishment by the court of jurisdiction of the
personal estate of the decedent. The receiver had made no
substantial progress in administration of it. The probate court
is open for application for administration. The real estate

will remain subject to the jurisdiction of the court, without
the expense and harassment of the respondents that receivership inevitably entails."
tion, and there seems no reason to permit a receiver to go beyond conservation and control of the property pending appointment of the personal representative. There seem to be no cases in this State of preadministration appointment of a receiver, so that the question of how
far his authority can extend---or what he can be directed to do--has
necessarily not arisen. There is no question, as the Court points out later
in its opinion, that with respect to the estates of deceased persons, the
Court of Common Pleas has concurrent jurisdiction with the probate
court, and once assumed by either court its jurisdiction will not, in most
cases, be disturbed by the other. The writer has earlier made the following comments (2 S.C. L. Q. 13, 50, note [1949]), for what they are
worth: "The principle of Common Pleas concurrence with the Probate
Court runs the scale of the latter's jurisdiction, including the probate of
wills (at least in solemn form), accountings, sale of land in aid of assets,
allotment of dower, matters touching upon minors and lunatics and the
administration of their estate. It is doubtful if the Court of Common
Pleas could, or would, admit a will to probate in common form, grant
letters testamentary or of administration, revoke letters, receive
returns in the absence of litigation, or do many of the routine acts of
administration devolving upon the Probate Judge."
Receivership after the inception of administration, where the estate
has been mishandled by the representative, is not uncommon in this
State, and once appointed the receiver performs virtually all the administrative duties of the representative. See, among others, EX parte
Galluchat, 1 Hill Equity 148 (1833); Gadsden v. Whaley, 14 S. C. 210
(1880); Harman v. Wagner, 33 S. C. 487, 12 S. E. 98 (1890); Smith v.
Heyward, 115 S. C. 145, 104 S.E. 473 (1920).
19. But the partition would have to await the grant of administration
and the making of the administrator a party unless all debts had been
paid, or a showing made that there was sufficient personal property in
the representative's hands for the purpose, or due permission made in
the decree for payment of debts-CmcuiT CouRt RuLE 54.
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[Vol. 11

Parties

The question whether in an action for accounting brought
by a single distributee against the administrator of an estate
the court could compel a joinder of all the other distributees,
at the instance of the administrator, was answered in the
affirmative in Singleton v. Singleton.20 Such a joinder was
ordered by the circuit court and the action thus taken was
affirmed on appeal. The plaintiff's objection that the circuit
court's order was an abuse of discretion was disposed of by
the Court's noting that the plaintiff's counsel had already
made an appearance in the probate court on behalf of most
of the heirs to resist the administrator's application for discharge, and that on general principles all the distributees,
having an interest in the subject matter, could properly be
brought in.2 1 All could be joined as plaintiffs, the Court observed, 22 and if any refused to become plaintiffs they could
be joined as defendants. The appellant's plaint that to make
the other distributees parties would place an undue burden
upon him was dismissed out of hand by the Court; and the
further complaint of burdensomeness because of the nonresidence of some of the parties was rejected, the Court calling
attention to the pertinent Code section (§ 10-451) relating to
service upon non-residents where the subject matter is personal property within the State.
20. 232 S. C. 441, 102 S. E. 2d 747 (1958).
21. Citing CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 10-202, 10-203,
10-204, 10-219, relating to making and bringing in of parties.
22. Citing Black v. Simpson, 94 S. C. 312, 77 S. E. 1023, 46 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 137 (1913), holding that several distributees, who had been paid
unequal amounts, could unite in an action against the administrator to
redress a breach of trust.
It would seem that while all the distributees could join as plaintiffs
or a single distributee plaintiff could make the remainder defendants, or,
as indicated in the reviewed case, the court could compel the joinder of
all, all the distributees are not necessary parties, so that a suit by a
single distributee cannot be said to be defective as lacking in parties
when the others are not joined. See 21 Am. Jur., Executors and Adminis-

trators § 479 (1939); 34 C. J. S., Executors and Administrators § 849

(1942). So much seems implicit in the present case. See, also, as holding
that all the distributees may join, Tucker v. Tucker, 13 S. C. 318 (1860);
and Stallings v. Barrett, 26 S. C. 474, 2 S. E. 483 (1886), where it is said
in a concurring opinion "There can be no doubt that several distributees
... may unite in demanding an account, in which they are all interested,
from the administrator, and that such is the proper practice, rather than
that each distributee should, in a separate action, demand from the administrator an account and payment to him of his share of the balance
found due by him upon such accounting." It would seem that the latter
practice, while deprecated, is not forbidden. See Tucker v. Tucker, ante.
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Sale by Fiduciaryto Self
In Scurry v. Edwards,2 3 a case noteworthy for its analysis
of the doctrine of part performance in relation to oral contracts for the sale of land, the Court was confronted with the
problem of a conveyance made by the committee of an incompetent to himself of an interest in land owned by the
incompetent. The transaction was upheld principally upon the
ground that there was a prior contract - which though oral
was taken out of the Statute of Frauds by part performance between the committee (as an individual) and his brother, for
the transfer of the latter's land to him. The brother had thereafter died intestate without having made the agreed transfer
and was survived, among others, by the ward. For all practical purposes the committee was fulfilling the prior contract,
and this the Court sanctioned, upon the familiar ground recognized in the law of trusts that the court would later approve what it would have approved if applied to in the first
instance. In leading up to this conclusion, however, the Court
took occasion to point out that "a guardian has no authority
to sell real estate of his ward without an order of court, and
that the courts will subject to the most rigid scrutiny a transaction whereby a guardian purchases or otherwise acquires
his ward's property." 24
Legislation
No great amount of or far-reaching legislation in the area
of wills and trusts was enacted during the 1958 session of
the General Assembly.
Section 19-531 of the 1952 Code, relating to the filing of
returns by executors and administrators, as amended by the
Act of 195625 reducing the period of the first return to five
months and succeeding returns to six months, was further
amended by Act 26 approved April 11, 1958, so as to permit an
executor or administrator, with the consent of the probate
23. 232 S.C. 53, 100 S. E. 2d 812 (1957).

24. It may be pointed out also that, like the guardian of an infant,

MecDuffie v. McIntyre, 11 S. C. 551 (1878), the committee of a person
non compos mentis has no title to the ward's property. McCreight v.
Aiken 3 Hill Law 338 (1837); Cathcart v. Sugenheimer, 18 S. C. 123
(1882$. The conveyance, therefore, by the committee conveyed nothing.

This is to be contrasted with an unauthorized transfer by a trustee, or
an improper transfer by a trustee to himself, where the transferee gets
at least a voidable title-the trustee having it to begin with.
25. Act No. 767.
26. Act No. 894.
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judge, to file the first return eleven months after appointment and thereafter every twelve months.
By Act No. 826, approved March 31, 1958, Section 9 of
Act No. 767 of the Acts of 1956 was repealed, and section
19-555 of the 1952 Code was amended so as to increase from
five hundred dollars to one thousand dollars the size of the
personal estate which the probate judge might distribute in
lieu of formal administration upon an intestate estate. Act
No. 826 is in reality a clarifying or curative statute, since it
embodies almost identically the Act of 1956 which it repeals.
That Act was not specifically designated as a repealer of
Section 19-555, nor did it purport to amend it. By implication
it did, however, but the 1958 Act makes plain the legislative
intention on the subject.
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